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Representing Clients in Family
Offense Proceedings
Ronald J. Bavero*
I. Preliminary Overview
Physical violence between members of the same family is a
problem of epidemic proportions. Recent statistics demonstrate
that an individual is more likely to be murdered by a member of
his or her own family, especially a spouse, than by any other
category of person. An estimated six million women are beaten
by their husbands or intimate partners each year. In addition,
the National Institute of Mental Health has identified battering
as the leading cause of injury to women - more than automobile
accidents, rapes and muggings combined. This crisis is dra-
matically illustrated each and every day in the news accounts of
individuals who are killed by spouses, seemingly, as they clutch
their orders of protection issued by the family or criminal court.
For the family law practitioner, the question often becomes
how best to protect the client from imminent and/or future inci-
dents of violence. For the court, the task is often reduced to
making the split-second decision of whether, and to what ex-
tent, it should invoke its enormous powers. Is this a situation
where the threat of violence is real and imminent or is the peti-
tioner unfairly and inappropriately attempting to use the pro-
ceeding to gain a strategical advantage in a current or
contemplated matrimonial proceeding? For the client, the ques-
tion often becomes one of survival. How does one protect one-
self from an angry, vindictive spouse who is threatening to
inflict injury - either physical or that which results from false
accusations?
* Mr. Bavero is a member of the firm of Berman, Bavero, Frucco, & Gouz p.c.
He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Co-chair of the
New York State Bar Association Committee on Adoption, and a member of the
Executive Committee of the New York State Bar Association Family Law
Committee.
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While there are no perfect answers to each of these ques-
tions, a thorough understanding of Article 8 of the Family Court
Act' ("FCA"), as well as the Family Protection and Domestic Vi-
olence Intervention Act of 1994,2 is an absolute prerequisite to
any meaningful attempt to resolve the competing and complex
issues presented.
II. Family Protection and Domestic Violence Intervention
Act of 1994
Over the course of the past fifteen years, the New York Leg-
islature has dramatically altered its views on how best to deal
with the problem of domestic violence. Prior to September 1,
1977, the family court was vested with exclusive original juris-
diction over family offense cases, subject only to the limited
right to transfer certain cases to the criminal court.3 This grant
to the family court of virtual exclusive jurisdiction over family
offenses was premised on the now discarded philosophy that do-
mestic violence was a "social problem" which did not require a
criminal response. 4 Indeed, the primary purpose of the FCA
was to render services to keep the family unit intact.5
Effective September 1, 1977, the criminal courts of the
State of New York were granted concurrent jurisdiction over
family offense cases.6 As a result of this legislative change, vic-
tims of family violence now had a "right of election". The victim
could initially choose to proceed in either the family court or the
criminal court.7 In essence, the choice of whether the abusing
spouse or family member would be criminally prosecuted was
passed from the court to the victim. However, the victim's right
of election became final three days after the filing of a petition
1. 1962 N.Y. Laws ch. 686 (codified as amended at N.Y. FAm. CT. AcT §§ 812-
47 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1995)).
2. 1994 N.Y. Laws ch. 222 (codified as amended in scattered sections of N.Y.
FAm. CT. AcT, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw, N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw, N.Y. PENAL LAW, N.Y.
JuD. LAw, and N.Y. ExEc. LAw).
3. 1964 N.Y. Laws ch. 154 § 812 (repealed 1977).
4. REPORT OF JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON COURT REORGANIZATION, THE
FAmmy COURT AcT, 1962 McKinney's Session Law, Part I at 3444.
5. Id. The aim is to provide "not punishment, but practical help," and thus aid
in "dealing with the underlying family difficulties .... " Id.
6. 1977 N.Y. Laws ch. 449, § 812.
7. Id.
[Vol. 16:49
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol16/iss1/5
REPRESENTING CLIENTS
in the family court or an accusatory instrument in the criminal
court.8 Accordingly, once the designated period had elapsed the
victim could not commence a new proceeding based upon the
same incidents in the other court.9
Effective January 1, 1996, the Family Protection and Do-
mestic Violence Intervention Act (DVIA) 10 dramatically alters
the way in which instances of domestic violence will be handled
by law enforcement officials, the courts, the victims and their
attorneys. This Act suggests that domestic violence cannot be
viewed or dealt with as merely a "social problem."'1 Rather,
through the DVIA, the legislature has declared that in order to
stem the tide of such violent incidents, offenders must be
treated harshly, swiftly and punitively. In relevant part, the
introductory paragraph of the bill provides:
The legislature further finds and declares that domestic violence
is criminal conduct occurring between members of the same fam-
ily or household which warrants stronger intervention than is
presently authorized under New York's laws .... Therefore, the
legislature finds and determines that it is necessary to strengthen
materially New York's statutes by providing for immediate deter-
rent action by law enforcement officials and members of the judi-
ciary, by increasing penalties for acts of violence within the
household, and by integrating the purposes of the family and
criminal laws to assure clear and certain standards of protection
for New York's families consistent with the interests of fairness
and substantial justice.12
In essence, the DVIA accomplishes four major changes in
the law. First, the new statute puts into place mandatory arrest
procedures which must be implemented by law enforcement offi-
8. N.Y. FAm. CT. Acr § 812(2)(e) (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1995).
9. People v. Perez, 109 Misc. 2d 291, 440 N.Y.S.2d 166 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1981).
10. 1994 N.Y. Laws ch. 222. The Family Protection and Domestic Violence
Intervention Act amends various provisions of the Family Court Act, Domestic Re-
lations Law, Criminal Procedures Law, Penal Law, Judiciary Law and Executive
Law. The mandatory arrest provisions of this law were to take effect on July 1,
1995 and sunset on January 1, 2001. Subsequent amendments have pushed back
the effective date of the mandatory arrest provisions from July 1, 1995 to October
1, 1995 and now January 1, 1996.
11. Id. § 1.
12. Id.
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cials.13 As a result of this Act, police officers must arrest an
abuser or offender if they have reasonable cause to believe such
individual:
has committed a felony upon a member of his or her family or
household; or has violated an order of protection by committing a
"family offense"; or has violated the "stay away" provisions of an
order of protection; or has committed a misdemeanor constituting
a "family offense", unless the victim requests otherwise. How-
ever, with regard to this latter provision, the police are specifi-
cally precluded from asking the victim of a misdemeanor family
offense whether he or she is seeking the arrest of the assailant.14
These mandatory arrest provisions took effect on January
1, 1996. However, even prior thereto, most police departments,
including the City of New York, had already put into place,
guidelines and protocols which effectuated the policy of the
DVIA and, in some instances, enlarged upon it. The intent of
the mandatory arrest provision is to remove from the police of-
ficer (and for that matter, the victim) the discretion of not ar-
resting the assailant. For all intents and purposes, whenever
police officers are called to the scene of a report of domestic vio-
lence and are shown an existing order of protection or any evi-
dence of physical injury, an arrest will be made.
Secondly, the DVIA repeals the prior three-day "choice of
forum" rule, which precluded victims of family violence from se-
curing access to both family and criminal court.' 5 Presently, a
victim of a family offense may now bring the case to the crimi-
nal court, the family court, or both courts.' 6
13. Id. § 32 (codified at N.Y. CraM. PRoc. LAw § 140.10(4) (McKinney Supp.
1995)).
14. Id.
15. As used in this article, the term "criminal court" refers to those courts
exercising jurisdiction over penal law felonies, misdemeanors and violations in-
cluding but not limited to the justice courts, town courts, district courts and county
courts of the State of New York.
16. Notwithstanding the fact that the legislation speaks of the "right" to pro-
ceed in the criminal court, it must be remembered that the district attorney's office
always retains discretion as to the filing of accusatory instruments. An individual
has an unqualified right to file a petition in the family court and cannot be refused
access to that court. This is not the case in criminal court. However, as a practical
matter, a district attorney's office would be loathe to refuse to file an accusatory
instrument where a prosecutable crime exists. In addition, a district attorney
must make a reasonable effort to notify the victim of a domestic violence incident
when a decision has been made to decline prosecution of the crime, to dismiss the
[Vol. 16:49
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Third, the DVIA grants to both the family court and the
criminal court expanded sanctions and remedies in dealing with
instances of domestic violence. For example, family court
judges have been granted greater latitude: (i) to issue warrants
of arrest,17 (ii) to issue longer orders of protection, 8 (iii) to direct
restitution of up to $10,000.00,19 (iv) to grant immediate tempo-
rary orders of child support 2o and (v) to direct a respondent to
participate in a "batterer's education program".21 Similarly,
criminal court judges have increased authority to grant similar
items of relief referred to above, as well as longer Adjournments
in Contemplation of Dismissal ("ACD")2. Moreover, various
provisions of the penal law have been amended to increase the
penalties for stalking, menacing and criminal contempt.23
Fourth, the DVIA provides for increased information, train-
ing and cooperation between the police, the judges and the dis-
trict attorneys. For example, a computerized state-wide
registry of orders of protection and arrest warrants has been in
operation since October 1, 1995. In addition, the New York Ju-
diciary Law section 2122 has been amended to require that
there be sharing of information regarding family offense pro-
ceedings in family and criminal court.25 Moreover, the DVIA
provides for the training of judges and district attorneys in the
requirements of new law.26 Ironically, no statutory provision
requires that civil or criminal defense attorneys be so trained.
criminal charges against the defendant or to enter into a plea arrangement. More-
over, where the family offense has been transferred from the family court to the
criminal court, the district attorney must advise the family court judge of the dis-
position of the criminal case. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 530.12(14) (McKinney 1995).
17. N.Y. FAm. CT. AcT § 827(a) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
18. Id. §§ 828(3) & 842(h).
19. Id. § 841(e).
20. Id. § 828(4).
21. Id. § 841(c).
22. N.Y. CRm. Paoc. LAw § 170.55 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
23. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.25 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1995); N.Y. PENAL
LAw § 120.14 (McKinney Supp. 1995); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 215.51 (McKinney 1988
& Supp. 1995).
24. N.Y. JuD. LAw § 212(e) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
25. Id.
26. 1994 N.Y. Laws ch. 222 § 48, as amended by 1994 N.Y. Laws ch. 224 § 9.
1995]
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III. Representing Clients in Family Offense Proceedings
Under Article 8 of the Family Court Act
Given the prevalence of domestic violence in our society to-
day, the family law practitioner is likely to represent a peti-
tioner or respondent in a family offense proceeding under Art. 8
of the FCA. Initially, the practitioner must appreciate that the
handling of this "civil proceeding" can have profound conse-
quences for his or her client, particularly in light of the fact that
parallel criminal prosecutions may be pending or contemplated.
Thus, no one should venture into such a proceeding without a
complete awareness of the relevant statutory provisions.
A. The Case for Petitioner
1. Initial Consultation and Advice
In most instances, the average practitioner comes in con-
tact with a victim of domestic violence when handling a pending
or contemplated matrimonial action. Typically, in the initial
phases of the attorney/client consultations, significant time is
spent extracting necessary financial information. Attorneys fre-
quently pay too little attention to the grounds for divorce, and
even less attention to whether their client has been the victim
of domestic violence. In the initial phases of the consultation, it
is critical for the attorney to explore these areas. If the client
has already been the victim of such episodes, the attorney must
make every attempt to obtain corroborative evidence. Such evi-
dence includes criminal convictions, police reports, hospital re-
ports, and prior family offense petitions and orders.
Also, while attorneys are now required to give their clients
a "Client's Bill of Rights,"27 the attorney is not required to pro-
vide information concerning community resources available to
victims of domestic violence. At the very least, attorneys should
explain to their client what he or she should do if there is any
further violence. The client's right to compel and the police of-
ficer's obligation to perform arrests should be discussed immedi-
ately. While it is anticipated that police officers will be fully
familiar with their statutory duty, a client who understands his
or her rights will find it easier to deal with the assailant as well
27. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1400.2 (1995).
[Vol. 16:49
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as the police officers who are called to the scene of a violent
episode.
For example, under the DVIA, a police officer investigating
a family offense must advise the victim of the availability of a
shelter or other services in the community, and provide written
notice to the victim of all their statutory rights and remedies. 28
A police officer is further required to assist a victim of domestic
violence in removing personal effects from the home, locating
safe havens such as a domestic violence shelter or the residence
of a friend or family member, and transporting a victim and his
or her children to the safe haven.29 In addition, the police officer
must assist the victim in obtaining medical treatment, and pro-
vide copies of incident reports to the victim at no cost. More-
over, the police officer must inform the victim of his or her
rights to proceed in the criminal court, the family court or both.
Finally, the police officer's discretion with regard to arresting
the alleged assailant has been severely circumscribed by stat-
ute, as explained above.
In addition to the foregoing, the family law practitioner
should provide the client with the names and telephone num-
bers of community resources, such as shelters, the New York
State Coalition Against Domestic Violence and the New York
Child Abuse Hotline Registry. (See Appendix A) Armed with
such information, the client will then be better able to deal with
any future episode of domestic violence.
2. Initiating Family Court Proceedings
When an episode of domestic violence occurs, the victim
must decide whether to initiate and pursue proceedings in the
family court. No longer is the victim bound to his or her initial
choice of forum. Instead, the victim may proceed in either the
criminal court, the family court or both.30 Moreover, such paral-
lel proceedings should not be considered duplicative, particu-
larly because a family court petitioner may obtain relief not
readily available in the criminal court. For example, as part of
the application for a temporary order of protection,31 a peti-
28. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 812(5) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
29. Id. See also N.Y. CaM. PRoc. LAw § 530.11 (6) (McKinney 1995).
30. N.Y. FAm. CT. AT § 812 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
31. Id. § 828(1)(a).
1995]
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tioner may now receive a temporary order of child support, a
medical support execution, a temporary order of custody, as
well as temporary exclusive use and occupancy of the marital
residence.3 2
The practitioner should not overlook the importance of ob-
taining an immediate ex parte order of child support. Until
now, application for such support orders required the filing of
petitions under Art. 4 of the FCA,33 statements of net worth,3 4
service of the petitions and court process.35 Typically, the re-
turn date for this support petition was a number of weeks after
the filing date. In the interim, the victim and her children may
not have had the financial ability to pay for alternate housing
and other necessities. Now, upon the initial appearance before
the family court judge on a request for a temporary order of pro-
tection (the timing of which is within the control of the peti-
tioner), the court may immediately issue a temporary order of
child support. The petitioner need not show immediate or
emergency need, or produce information regarding the respon-
dent's income or assets.36
The amendment to FCA section 828 refers only to the right
of the court to fix a temporary order of child support. However,
a childless victim of domestic violence may also need support.
Where the parties are married, a statutory obligation to support
the spouse is present.3 7 Thus, the failure to include language
authorizing the court to grant an immediate order of spousal
support may be viewed as a legislative oversight which the
court may correct.
Apart from the obvious benefits of obtaining immediate fi-
nancial relief in the family court, as well as the opportunity to
secure orders of custody and "stay away" orders of protection,38
the practitioner should not forget that the ultimate burden of
proof with regard to the allegations of a petition is a "fair pre-
32. Id. § 828(4).
33. Id. § 423.
34. Id. § 424-a.
35. Id. § 427.
36. Id. § 828(b)(4).
37. Id. § 412.
38. A stay away order of protection operates as a grant of exclusive use and
occupancy of the marital residence.
[Vol. 16:49
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ponderance of the evidence." 9 In the criminal court, the burden
is "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" - a much higher standard.
Thus, it is easier to obtain the ultimate relief sought in the fam-
ily court.
Once the victim has decided to file a family offense proceed-
ing, the next tactical decision is whether the attorney should
prepare a family offense petition and appear with the petitioner
for the ex parte application for a temporary order of protection.
Certainly many petitioners successfully initiate family offense
proceedings without the assistance of counsel. By statute and
court rule, the family court must assist the petitioner in prepar-
ing the petition (the drafting is usually done by a probation of-
ficer employed by the county), and must grant court access
either on the day the petitioner initially appears or "the next
day that the family court is open. "40
The assistance of counsel is not only a statutory right,41 but
also advisable, especially in the early stages of the proceedings.
For example, an attorney representing the petitioner is more
likely to draft a legally sufficient complaint. By appearing with
the petitioner at the initial ex parte proceeding, counsel will be
able to make appropriate applications for child support, custody
and related relief. Every practitioner should have in his or her
office current copies of the family offense forms which can be
obtained from the family court.42
Once a temporary order of protection has been obtained,
counsel for the petitioner should arrange service upon the re-
spondent of the family offense petition, the summons, and the
temporary order of protection. The petitioner may want to have
a police or peace officer serve these documents. This will not
only save the party the cost of a process server, but also signal
to the respondent the seriousness of the matter.4 Also, copies
of the temporary order of protection should be given to the po-
lice departments or agencies where the petitioner, resides and
39. Id. § 832.
40. N.Y. FAm. CT. AcT § 153-c (McKinney 1983). See id. § 216-c. See also N.Y.
Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, § 205.71 (1995).
41. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 262(A)(ii) (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1995).
42. Id. § 216-b.
43. See N.Y. FAm. CT. Acr § 153-b(b) (McKinney Supp. 1995) (allowing peace
officers and police officers to serve summonses, petitions or temporary orders of
protection upon request).
1995]
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works. The petitioner should also carry a copy of the order at
all times. While the need for such action may be obviated by
the Statewide Central Registry which went into effect October
1, 1995, nothing is lost by taking these additional precautionary
steps.
In the alternative, if the petitioner establishes the neces-
sary prerequisites, the court may also secure the attendance of
the accused by means of a warrant of arrest.44 One statutory
predicate for the issuance of a warrant is the presence of "aggra-
vating circumstances". 45 This term is defined by the statute to
include circumstances where the assailant has caused "physical
injury" or "serious physical injury" to the petitioner, used a
"dangerous instrument", has a history of repeated violations of
prior orders of protection or prior convictions. 46 Counsel for pe-
titioner should be aware of these circumstances and be able to
present them to the court as part of the initial application for a
temporary order of protection and a warrant of arrest.
3. Preliminary Proceedings
Upon filing the petition, the court will fix a return date for
the preliminary proceedings. In most instances, the return date
is within the period when the temporary order of protection will
expire. However, the practitioner should remember that if the
preliminary proceeding does not occur within that time frame,
he or she can apply to the court for an extension of the tempo-
rary order of protection.47 This application may be made ex
parte or on notice, as the court may direct.48
Upon the initial appearance before the court on a family
offense petition, both the petitioner and respondent must be ad-
vised of certain rights they have, including the right to coun-
sel.49 By virtue of the DVIA, the family court judge must
inquire about the existence of any other orders of protection in-
volving the parties.50 In addition, the respondent must be told
44. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 827(a) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
45. Id. § 827(a)(vii).
46. Id.
47. Id. § 828(3).
48. Id.
49. Id. § 812(5); see id. § 1033-b(1)(b).
50. Id. § 821-a(6).
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the allegations of the petition, and be provided with a copy of
the petition.51 Assuming that the matter is not disposed of at
the preliminary proceeding, the court must consider whether to
release the respondent on his or her own recognizance or direct
the respondent to post bail. 52
In most courts, it is common for a court representative such
as a probation officer to determine whether the matter can be
disposed of without further court proceedings. Although there
is no statutory authority, custom and usage allows the court to
accept a consent to the issuance of a permanent order of protec-
tion "without admitting or denying the allegations." However,
such a disposition or "plea" does not represent a finding on the
merits of the allegations of the petition.
Furthermore, petitioner and counsel should be wary of ac-
cepting "mutual" orders of protection as an informal way of
resolving the matter. Indeed, the family court is statutorily
precluded from issuing affirmative relief to a respondent where
no petition or answer containing a counterclaim alleging a fam-
ily offense has been filed with the court.53 In most instances,
denials are entered at the preliminary proceedings and the mat-
ter is set down for further hearings.
4. Hearings
a. Fact Finding Hearing
If a denial has been entered in response to a family offense
petition, the court must hold a fact-finding hearing to determine
whether the allegations can be supported by "a fair preponder-
ance of the evidence".54 Only competent, material, and relevant
evidence is admissible. 55 This hearing may not be held sooner
than three days after the service of the petition, unless the re-
spondent consents.56 Moreover, the court may adjourn such
hearing, for good cause, sua sponte or on motion of either
51. Id. § 1033-b(1)(b).
52. N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAw § 510.10 (McKinney 1995); see id. §§ 510.15-.30
(procedures and rules guiding court's decision).
53. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 841 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
54. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 832 (McKinney 1983).
55. Id. § 834.
56. Id. § 826(a).
1995]
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party.57 The petitioner is entitled to have a "non-witness friend,
relative, counsellor or social worker present in the courtroom."58
A more limited right to have an "ally" in the courtroom exists
for respondents (i.e., when such individual is not represented by
counsel).59
Before the fact-finding hearing, the practitioner should do a
number of things. First and foremost, the petition should be
examined for legal sufficiency, especially if it was not drafted by
an attorney. In doing so, the examiner should recall that the
term "family offense" as used in the FCA and New York Crimi-
nal Procedure Law has a very definite meaning. 60 Not every
criminal act committed by one family member upon another is a
"family offense." The family court may exercise jurisdiction
only where the acts committed constitute one or more of the fol-
lowing penal law violations:
disorderly conduct;
harassment in the first degree;
harassment in the second degree;
menacing in the second degree;
menacing in the third degree;
reckless endangerment;
assault in the second degree (or an attempted assault);
assault in the third degree (or an attempted assault).61
All other criminal acts between family members (e.g., larceny,
criminal possession of a weapon, criminal mischief or rape) can
only be prosecuted in the criminal court.62 Thus, when deter-
mining whether alleged conduct falls within one of the enumer-
ated offenses, reference must be made to the particular
provisions of the penal law which define such offenses. 63
57. Id. § 836(a).
58. Id. § 838.
59. Id.
60. See Roofeh v. Roofeh, 138 Misc. 2d 889, 525 N.Y.S.2d 765 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1988); DiDonna v. DiDonna, 72 Misc. 2d 231, 339 N.Y.S.2d 592 (Faro. Ct.
Ulster County 1972).
61. N.Y. CRm. PROC. LAW § 530.11 (McKinney 1995).
62. Id.
63. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 240.20, 240.25, 240.26, 120.14, 120.15, 120.20,
120.25, 120.00 and 120.05. For a more extensive discussion of these Penal Law
offenses as they apply to Article 8 of the FCA, see Ronald J. Bavero, Family Of-
fenses, I Know Them When I See Them, FAm. L. REV., May 1986, at 22.
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After having examined the petition for sufficiency, the prac-
titioner is then ready to prepare the witnesses for the hearing
and to marshall the evidence which will be produced at the said
hearing. The practitioner should first obtain copies of all prior
statements made by his or her client regarding the allegations
in the petition. For example, the practitioner should obtain the
petitioner's testimony before the family court during the ex
parte application for a temporary order of protection, as well as
police reports and hospital reports. In addition, if any of the
incidents referred to in the petition were also discussed in affi-
davits or pleadings submitted to the supreme court, such docu-
ments should be reviewed. All of these documents should be
discussed with the petitioner, especially if any inaccuracies or
inconsistencies are contained therein.
Next, the practitioner should prepare the client for direct
and cross-examination, with a view toward establishing each
and every element of the family offense petition. Care must be
taken to establish that the respondent's conduct falls within the
statutory definition of the offense (i.e. the respondent caused
physical injury), and that the respondent acted with the requi-
site culpable mental state (i.e. the respondent intentionally or
recklessly caused such injury).
Finally, the practitioner should consider the availability
and the utility of corroborative evidence. Photographs which
portray the injuries are important. Tape recordings of the re-
spondent screaming at the petitioner or making threats can be
particularly effective. Certified copies of hospital reports6 4 as
well as certified copies of prior court orders, and convictions of
the family or criminal court are also helpful. The practitioner
should not overlook the usefulness of any prior determination of
the criminal court. Assuming that a parallel criminal proceed-
ing has resulted in a conviction of the respondent, by plea or
trial, on the very same allegations which are the subject of the
instant family court petition, the practitioner may invoke the
doctrine of collateral estoppel by using the criminal court con-
viction and eliminating the need for a fact-finding determina-
tion in the family court. If the respondent has been convicted of
the very same offense in a criminal court (the standard of proof
64. See N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 4518(c) (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1995).
1995]
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being proof beyond a reasonable doubt - a higher standard than
required in the family court), that conviction is conclusive proof
of the underlying facts and need not be relitigated in the subse-
quent family court proceeding.65 Thus, a motion for summary
judgment on the family offense allegations would be
appropriate.6
Typically, at the conclusion of the fact-finding hearing, the
court decides whether or not the petition has been sustained. In
the event the petition has not been sustained, a dispositional
order dismissing the petition will be entered. 67 However, if the
allegations of the petition are established, the court is then re-
quired to hold a dispositional hearing.68
b. Dispositional Hearing
Following the pattern found throughout the FCA, Art. 8
contemplates two separate hearings: one to establish the verac-
ity of the allegations, and the second to determine what type of
dispositional order is appropriate.69 The dispositional hearing
may commence immediately following the fact-finding hear-
ing,70 or the court may adjourn the second hearing in order to
obtain additional information relevant to the disposition. 71 For
example, the court may order a probation investigation. 72 In
addition, counsel for the petitioner may seek to introduce testi-
mony or evidence which was technically inadmissible at the
fact-finding hearing. 73 For example, one of the dispositional al-
65. See S.T. Grand Inc. v. City of New York, 32 N.Y.2d 300, 298 N.E.2d 105,
344 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1973); Schwartz v. Pub. Adm'r of County of Bronx, 24 N.Y.2d 65;
246 N.E.2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969).
66. See Suffolk County v. James M., 83 N.Y.2d 178, 630 N.E.2d 636, 608
N.Y.S.2d 940 (1994). In James M., the Court of Appeals precluded the respondent
in a proceeding under Article 10 of the FCA from relitigating the issue of abuse
where he had been previously convicted of sexually abusing this same stepchild in
the criminal court. 83 N.Y.2d at 182-83, 630 N.E.2d at 637-38, 608 N.Y.S.2d at
941-42. In doing so, the Court of Appeals approved of the use of a motion for sum-
mary judgment as the appropriate vehicle to raise the defense of collateral estop-
pel. 83 N.Y.2d at 182, 630 N.E.2d at 637, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 941.
67. N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 841(a) (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1995).
68. Id. § 835(a).
69. Id. §§ 832, 833.
70. Id. § 835(a).
71. Id. § 836(b).
72. Id. § 1047 commentary at 401.
73. Id. § 834.
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ternatives available to the court under prior law was the issu-
ance of a permanent order of protection for a period of up to one
year.74 However, as a result of the DVIA, the court is now au-
thorized to issue a three year order of protection where there
are "aggravating circumstances" - the same aggravating factors
the court must assess in determining whether to issue a war-
rant of arrest.75 Thus, even if proof of prior instances of domes-
tic violence, violations of prior orders, or incidents involving the
respondent and other family members has not been submitted
in the fact-finding hearing, such evidence may now be received
at the dispositional hearing. Since it is usually not the practice
of the court to hold separate hearings, it is respectfully sug-
gested that counsel attempt to present such proof as part of the
fact-finding hearing. However, if the court will not allow such
testimony as part of a separate fact-finding hearing, the counsel
for the petitioner should seek to include it as part of the disposi-
tional hearing.
c. Orders
(1) Orders of Disposition
At the conclusion of the dispositional hearing, the court has
various options available. It may enter an order:
(a) Dismissing the petition, based upon a failure of proof;76
(b) Suspending judgment for a period not in excess of six
months;77
(c) Placing respondent on probation for a period not exceeding one
year and requiring respondent to participate in a batterer's
education program;78 or
(d) Making an order of protection for up to one year or three
years, depending upon the existence of aggravating circum-
stances; 79 or
(e) Directing the payment of restitution in an amount not to ex-
ceed $10,000.00;80 or
74. Id. § 842.
75. Id. §§ 827, 842.
76. Id. § 841(a).
77. Id. § 841(b).
78. Id. § 841(c).
79. Id. § 841(d).
80. Id. § 841(e).
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(f) Combining certain of the dispositional alternatives. (i.e., an or-
der of protection and an order of restitution).81
Both the FCA and the Uniform Rules for the Family Court
prescribe the permissible terms and conditions which may be
attached to each type of order.82 Thus, respondents may be re-
quired to abstain from certain forms of offensive behavior; to
stay away from the petitioner's home, place of employment or
school; to cooperate in obtaining medical, psychiatric or sub-
stance abuse treatment; to attend a batterer's education pro-
gram; to pay for medical bills, child support and restitution.
Moreover, successful petitioners who elect to be represented by
retained counsel may obtain an award of counsel fees and dis-
bursements as a condition of an order of protection. 83
Finally, FCA section 841 now precludes the belated and de-
fensive applications for a "mutual" order of protection, unless a
proper pleading has been filed. In relevant part, section 841 de-
clares that:
"No order of protection may direct any party to observe conditions
of behavior unless the party requested in the order of protection
has served and filed a petition or counter-claim in accordance
with Section 150-4-b of this act."84
B. Representing Respondents in Article 8 Proceedings
Over the past number of years, the family law practitioner,
particularly one representing clients in matrimonial actions,
has been called upon to become familiar with a wide variety of
related legal areas in order to properly represent a client. Typi-
cally, the matrimonial attorney must be familiar with the Do-
mestic Relations Law, the FCA, Internal Revenue Code, and the
Bankruptcy Act. In addition, he or she must be familiar with
corporate law, real estate law and principals of accounting and
with the advent of the DVIA, attorneys need to be familiar with
criminal procedure law and penal law as well.
81. Id. § 841.
82. Id. § 842; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 205.74 (1995).
83. N.Y. FAm. CT. AcT § 842(f) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
84. Id. § 841.
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Given the mandatory arrest provisions 5 of the DVIA, it is
highly probable that during the course of one's matrimonial
practice, the practitioner will receive a call from a client who
has been arrested. Thus, the practitioner should familiarize
himself with criminal procedure law provisions dealing with
bail, release on one's own recognizance and basic practice in the
local criminal court. In the alternative, the family law practi-
tioner should become familiar with criminal law attorneys who
can handle such exigent circumstances.
Moreover, every attorney handling an Art. 8 proceeding
must be profoundly aware that this civil proceeding can have
enormous consequences on any parallel criminal proceeding
which is pending or contemplated. Statements made by a re-
spondent during the course of this civil proceeding may be used
as admissions in any related criminal action. Indeed, as part of
the DVIA, a new section of the criminal procedure law has been
added. New York Criminal Procedure Law § 60.46 provides
that evidence of a written or oral admission or any testimony
given by a respondent is barred from use in a criminal proceed-
ing only where the party against whom such statement or testi-
mony is offered is without the benefit of counsel at the time that
such statement is made. The necessary corollary is that when
such statements or testimony are made at a time that the party
has counsel, they may also be used in the criminal proceeding.
Moreover, FCA section 815 requires the family court, upon writ-
ten request of the district attorney, to provide a copy of the tran-
script of any family offense proceeding to the district attorney
when necessary to conduct a criminal investigation or prosecu-
tion involving the petitioner or the respondent. With this back-
ground in mind, we turn now to an examination of the issue of
how best to represent a respondent in the family court
proceeding.
1. Initial Consultation and Advice
As is the case with representing petitioners, the attorney
should obtain, during the initial consultation or stages of the
attorney/client relationship, all relevant information concerning
prior acts of violence within the family. The client should be
85. N.Y. CRim. PRoc. LAW § 140.10 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
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given the same information about the new mandatory arrest
provisions and telephone numbers to be used in case of an emer-
gency. Moreover, where the client is the subject of a temporary
order of protection, thought must be given as to whether the
client should continue to reside with the petitioner pending the
resolution of the matter.
2. Preliminary Appearance in the Family Court
As soon as respondent has been served the family offense
petition, the attorney should scrutinize the petition for legal
sufficiency. If the allegations do not rise to the level of a family
offense, a motion to dismiss should be prepared. Counsel may
wish to make an immediate application to vacate the temporary
order of protection, particularly when the order is based upon a
defective petition. In the past, such applications could have
been made ex parte since the temporary order was obtained in
that fashion. However, by virtue of the DVIA amendment of
FCA section 154-b, any motion to vacate or modify an order of
protection must be on notice to the non-moving party.
Additionally, counsel for the respondent should consider
whether the facts justify the filing of a family offense petition
against the petitioner and a request for a temporary order of
protection on behalf of the respondent. This should not be done
automatically or as a tactical maneuver without regard to the
facts and law relative to whether a family offense has actually
been committed by the petitioner. Respondent's counsel may
also assert such allegations as a counterclaim filed in an an-
swer.86 However, the latter procedure does not afford the re-
spondent the opportunity to obtain an immediate temporary
order of protection on his or her behalf.
Moreover, respondent's counsel should be alert to whether
the petition contains extraneous, scandalous and prejudicial
material. If it does, a motion to strike, pursuant to CPLR sec-
tion 3024, should be made as well. For example, if the petition
contains additional information concerning prior family offense
proceedings and orders, one may legitimately argue that such
allegations have no place in the petition, but rather are appro-
priate only to disposition.
86. N.Y. FAm. CT. AcT § 154-b (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1995).
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3. Preliminary Proceedings in Family Court
Upon the initial appearance before the family court, re-
spondent's counsel should waive a reading of the petition and
further advisement of the respondent's rights. Thought should
be given to whether to set the matter down for a hearing or to
attempt to resolve the case at the initial proceedings. Most fam-
ily courts allow a respondent to consent to an order of protection
"without admitting or denying the allegations." This type of
disposition may be appropriate and wise under certain circum-
stances. For example, where the evidence is strongly against
the respondent, such a disposition may be prudent because it
does not represent a finding on the merits of the case. Secondly,
a resolution of the matter in the family court may dissuade the
district attorney from further prosecution of the matter in fam-
ily court. Third, the respondent will not be in a position where
admissions or statements made during the course of the family
court proceeding will thereafter be used against him or her in
the criminal proceeding.8 7
In the event a strategic decision is made to enter a denial,
the matter will then be fixed for a hearing. If the respondent is
in custody and cannot make bail, the hearing must be held in
the family court within 120 hours of the arrest, unless a week-
end occurs in the interim and, in that event, within 144 hours of
arrest.s8 Typically however, the hearings will not take place for
a number of weeks after the preliminary proceedings. In that
time period, counsel will have the opportunity to seek further
discovery and disclosure and make appropriate motions to dis-
miss. It should be noted that the case law which has developed
under Article 8 severely restricts the right of a respondent's at-
torney to obtain discovery. For example, in Kunz v. Kunz,89 the
court turned aside a respondent's request for an examination
before trial (EBT) of the petitioner. Kunz does not however,
stand for the proposition that no discovery may be afforded. For
example, Bills of Particular or discovery of medical records, as
well as interrogatories, may be employed to flesh out the scope
of the petition.
87. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 60.46 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
88. N.Y. FAm. CT. AcT § 821-a (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1995).
89. 119 Misc. 2d 80, 462 N.Y.S.2d 559 (Faro. Ct., Nassau County 1983)
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In addition, the respondent's counsel should make every ef-
fort to obtain all of the prior statements made by the petitioner.
Attempts should be made to secure hospital records and police
reports which include statements made by the petitioner. In
addition, the respondent's counsel should order a copy of the
minutes of the petitioner's original application for a temporary
order of protection, since it will contain the petitioner's version
of the facts and incident under examination. The respondent's
counsel should also review affidavits and pleadings made by the
petitioner in the supreme court to see whether other references
are made to allegations contained in the petition.
4. Fact-Finding Hearing
Every attempt should be made to keep testimony within
the four corners of the petition and not allow the petitioner or
counsel to expand upon the allegations previously made. In
many instances, the petitioner's counsel has never prosecuted
criminal cases nor presented family offense petitions. Accord-
ingly, an important element of the defense may be watching for
defects in the proof. For example, the respondent's conduct may
not precisely fit within the statutory elements of harassment or
disorderly conduct. The petitioner's counsel may omit neces-
sary proof with regard to the existence of physical injury °
Moreover, counsel may have failed to demonstrate that the re-
spondent acted with the necessary culpable mental state (i.e.,
with intent to harass, intent to cause physical injury, etc.). For
example, in DiDonna v. DiDonna,9 the petitioner alleged that
the respondent engaged in certain conduct but the respondent
successfully responded that such conduct was not done with the
intent to harass or to cause public inconvenience, annoyance
and alarm.9 2
Finally, counsel for the respondent should be alert to the
constitutional issues raised when the petitioner attempts to call
the respondent as a witness in the case. First and foremost, the
respondent, like a criminal defendant, has a constitutional right
90. See Matter of Phillip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 400 N.E.2d 358, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418
(1980) (dealing with the insufficiency of evidence presented by the prosecutor re-
garding "physical injury").
91. 72 Misc. 2d 231, 339 N.Y.S.2d 592 (Farn. Ct. Ulster County 1972).
92. 72 Misc. 2d at 237, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 599.
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to remain silent where the answer might incriminate him in a
future criminal proceeding.93 However, unlike a criminal case,
the respondent in this Article 8 civil proceeding may be called
by the adverse party. Typically however, when a party to a civil
proceeding elects to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege, an
adverse inference can be drawn.94 However, counsel for respon-
dent can argue (in this context, and particularly where there is
a parallel criminal proceeding) that no such adverse inference is
appropriate since it would impermissibly infringe upon the de-
fendant's rights in the criminal proceeding and chill his decision
in the pending civil proceeding.
5. Dispositional Hearing on Petitions
At the conclusion of the fact-finding hearing and assuming
that a dismissal has not occurred, counsel for respondent should
request a separate dispositional hearing. At that point, addi-
tional evidence may be introduced, which is relevant to the dis-
positional alternatives. For example, material which might
otherwise be inadmissible at the fact-finding hearing (e.g., let-
ters and affidavits from ministers, clergy members, and other
character references) is admissible at the dispositional hearing.
6. Violation Proceedings
While orders of protection are intended to stop the cycle of
violence, they are neither magical nor foolproof. Not surpris-
ingly, the successful petitioner may find the need to seek en-
forcement of the order on one or more occasions. The DVIA
substantially strengthens the penalties which arise from any vi-
olation of an existing court order. For example, if the violation
involves a further family offense, the petitioner may elect to
pursue this new matter in the criminal court (i) as an original
criminal offense, and (ii) as an act constituting criminal con-
tempt.95 Alternatively, the petitioner may proceed in the family
court as (i) a new petition or (ii) a violation petition in the fam-
93. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973) (stating defendant is privileged
"not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or crimi-
nal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future crimi-
nal proceedings.").
94. Id.
95. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 215.50-.51 (McKinney 1988).
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ily court under FCA section 846. The petitioner may also pro-
ceed in both courts (subject to double jeopardy limitations).
In this regard, there are both constitutional and statutory
limitations which protect an individual from repeated incarcer-
ation or punishment for the same offense. 96 However, such diffi-
cult and esoteric issues can be avoided by the type of
cooperation and discretion which is now vested by the DVIA in
the courts, the prosecutors and the victims of violent acts. The
mere fact that a victim may have a right to proceed in more
than one court does not mean that such multiple proceedings
are necessary or advisable.
In any event, based upon a violation proceeding under sec-
tion 846-a, the family court is authorized to incarcerate the re-
spondent for a period of up to six months. A family court
sentence of six months means exactly that - there is no time off
for good behavior or other minimizations of such a sentence.
Moreover, any violation of a court order, including a temporary
order of protection, gives the court the right to immediately re-
voke pistol licenses and permits, and to direct the immediate
surrender of any and all firearms.97
The procedure for filing and service of any violation petition
is outlined in FCA section 846. In this regard, care should be
taken to assure that if a summons is employed as a method of
securing the respondent's presence before the court, the appro-
priate warnings appear on the face of the summons. 98 Indeed,
the absence of such warnings is a jurisdictional defect which
may lead to dismissal of the violation proceeding.
Finally, it should be noted that a respondent is entitled to
the same two-fold hearing process as employed on the initial
petition. However, it is respectfully suggested that the burden
of proof at a violation hearing must be more than the fair pre-
96. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) and United States
v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993), for the leading constitutional cases involving the
Double Jeopardy clause. Moreover, the rights of the respondent/defendant are fur-
ther protected by N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw §§ 40.20, 40.30 and 40.54. For a concise
discussion of the potential problems inherent in multiple proceedings involving the
DVIA, see Lisa Fishchel-Wolovick, Double Jeopardy and Domestic Violence Law,
N.Y. L.J., June 22, 1995 at 1.
97. N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT § 846-a (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1995).
98. Id. § 846(b).
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ponderance of the evidence, particularly in light of the possibil-
ity of incarceration. 99
IV. Summary
Recent national events, such as the trial of O.J. Simpson,
have cast the spotlight of national media upon the problem of
domestic violence. Responding to this and other notorious cases
of domestic violence, the New York Legislature has significantly
strengthened the laws of this state with regard to the handling
of domestic violence. It can reasonably be expected that the
courts and law enforcement will no longer minimize or tolerate
behavior which at its essence is violent, destructive and crimi-
nal. Assailants and people who perpetrate episodes of domestic
violence will henceforth be treated harshly and swiftly. Unfor-
tunately, it also may be anticipated that unscrupulous litigants
and attorneys will seek to misuse this wave of public enlighten-
ment for their own venal purposes. Thus, it will be left to the
attorneys and the court to determine whether the instances re-
ported require the full brunt of the law or whether there is a
misuse of the system being perpetrated by one of the parties.
99. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
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APPENDIX A
NEW ROCHELLE WHITE PLAINS
FAMILY COURT FAMILY COURT
(914)633-1288 (914)285-1020
Third Floor Sixth Floor
420 North Avenue 111 Grove Street
FAMILY ABUSE COURT SERVICES
crisis support for abused family members
For Counseling and Support
(914)949-1212
A service of Mental Health Association of
Westchester County, Inc.
HOTLINES
Mental Health Association
Family Abuse Services ............................... 949-1212
Family Abuse Hotline ................................ 997-1010
My Sister's Place (Shelter) ........................... 969-5800
Northern Westchester Shelter Hotline ................ 747-0707
N.Y. State Coalition Against Domestic Violence
Emergency ...................................... 800-942-6906
Spanish ......................................... 800-942-6908
Putnam/No. Westchester
Women's Resource Center ............................ 682-2166
Rape Crisis Help Line ................................ 682-9877
New York Child Abuse
Hotline Registry ................................ 800-342-3720
Suicide Crisis Line .................................. 946-0121
United Way Helpline ................................ 949-4636
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